Prior to the the Second World War there was widespread interest evoked by developements in 1921 relating to the political relationship between the United States and Japan, the naval resources of these two powers, and the strategical problems that could arise in the unhappy event of an armed conflict for the mastery of the Pacific. Preface Sea-Power in the Pacific 1921 Hector. C. Bywater.
Both in Japan and the United States their exists those who believe that war is the only solvent of the differences grown up between the two nations since 1900.
General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia from the Phillippines on the 17th March 1941, (Lieut. General Wainwright remaining behind to command US Phillipine Forces and capture)
MacArhur was appointed Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific Area. He was received by Prime Minister Curtin as a conquering hero not as a defeated General from the Phillippines abandoning the US Forces. MacArthur was described as a paranoid egotist, his famous words "There can be no compromise. We shall win, or we shall die, and to this I pledge you the full resources of all the mighty power of my country and the blood of my countrymen".
Extract "Hyper War: US Army in WW11: Victory in Papua "
By agreement among the Governments of Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States there has been constituted, effective 1400 GMT, 18 April 1942, the Southwest Pacific area, with boundaries as defined in annex 1.
On 18 April, a month after his arrival in Australia, General Douglas MacArthur assumed command of the Southwest Pacific Area and chose to designate himself as Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area. All combat echelons of the Australian forces, naval, ground, and air were assigned to his command as of that date, and the Australian Commanders concerned were notified that orders issued by him as Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area were to be considered "as emanating from the Australian Commonwealth Government"
The MacArthur's blood being, US Army 1 Battalion Field Artillery Regiment (560 All ranks).diverted to New Caledonia when enroute to Manila, and transported from Darwin aboard the Burns Philp ship MV Tulagi en route to Dutch Timor, in support of the Australian Army "Sparrow Force" to repel the Japanese southern invasion to Australia. This convoy was attacked by Japanese aircraft and returned to Darwin to be involved in the heavy Japanese air raid on 19th February 1942,
MacArthur Supreme Commander South West Pacific Area, had only two divisions of raw poorly trained National Guard.
Australia being dependent on the recently returned 7th Division and a brigade of the 6th Division and five Divisions of poorly trained conscripts (Choco's). Two of these 5 Divisions of conscripted Militia units the 39th Battalion fromVictoria and the 53rd from NSW acquitted themselves on the Kokoda Trail stood their ground against moumental odds, and set the seal for the entire future Allied New Guinea Campaign and Milne Bay. The Australian victory in this first New Guinea campaign of 1942/43 and the Coral Sea Battle, stopped the Japanese Forces from invading Australia, and remains the most important episode in Australia's history.
Two Militia Battalions average age under 19, were rushed to Port Moresby after Pearl Harbor aboard the troop transport Aquitania, on arrival they were set to work as Docks Operating Units dischargeing merchant ships and preparing defences around Port Moresby, as a last stand against the 14,000 strong Japanese South Seas Detachment Forces and their Bushido tradition, it ended with the battle of the beaches, Milne Bay, Buna, Gona, Sanananda, Salamaua, Lae, Madang, Finschafen, Alexishafen, Aitape, Wewak, Wom Peninsular, along the coast of northern New Guinea to Hollandia at all times supplied by Allied Merchant Ships, these campaigns were the first time Tanks were used in jungle warfare. Australian Defence Forces suffered more casualties than it did in any other WW11 campaign.
It was at this time that Prime Minister Curtin and the Australian Government made the greatest mistake of judgement at the beginning of the "Battle For Australia", costing the lives of thousands of Australian service personnel, and Merchant Seamen. On 3rd April 1942 PM Curtin received a copy of a directive sent to MacArthur by the Joint Chiefs of Staff US, confirming and defining his orders and powers,quote "Your staff will include officers assigned by the respective Governments (Aust & NZ) concerned made directly to commanders of the various forces in your area" . However, when MacArthur announced his staff on 19th April 1942 it contained not one Australian soldiers name.
This blunder on the part of Prime Minister Curtin and his appointment of Sir Thomas Blamey as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces South West Pacific on 23 March 1941 was most detrimental to the conduct of the New Guinea and Papuan campaign. Prime Minister Curtin and General Sir Thomas Blamey had now become subservient to MacArthur and the US Command.
On 8 April 1941 MacArthur had formed a solely American staff and a two way communication between himself and Prime Minister Curtin regarding the direction of the war, this was to cost the lives of many Australian Servicemen, Merchant Seamen, and the loss of thousands of tons of Australian and Allied Shipping, which could least be afforded. Gen. MacArthur had now become the key military adviser to the Australian Government.
Since victory in island warfare is generally determined by which side has control of the sea, those forces defending the islands are eventually left with two options, annihalation or surrender, Japanese forces only had the option of annihalation, since the narrow interpretation of "loyalty" to the nation and the Emperor considered surrender disloyal.
In the natural environment of New Guinea, this appears to have been the only choice available. However, the Japanese in New Guinea chose a third option of advancing into the inland areas. More than 10,000 Japanese soldiers, repeatededly climbed mountains 4,000 metres high, after being informed of the Japanese inland retreat General MacArthur stated "the jungle will finish them off for us let them wither on the vine" hence the reason for his island hopping strategy with US Forces, and leaving the Australian Forces to clean out the Japanese inland retreat. The remark indicates, the jungle and steep terrain that took a heavy toll on the sacrifice of Japanese forces, and the heavy loss of life of Australian Forces crossing the several mountain ranges, the large disease infested swamps along the Sepik, Ramu, Markham, Rivers, the Battle of the Kokoda Trail. The tenacious fighting and survival qualities of Australan and Japanese forces, the huge loss of life in retrospect, could have been avoided with a more controlling chain of command with the experienced Ausralian Officers returning from the Middle East Campaign, than existed between Pime Minister Curtin, General Blamey, and General MacArthur.
The commandeering of Australia's Merchant Fleet during WW2 by the government of the day comprises a neglected chapter in our maritime history. A singular example is the destruction by Japanese bombers of the Burns Philp merchant ships MV Macdhui and submarine attack on MV Malaita in 1942. These and further incidents involving SS Montoro, SS Mangola, MV Muliama, became a bitter rivalry between civilian, military and naval authorities, for failing to provide adequate protection for these BP vessels known to be earmarked for destruction by the Japanese and is chronicled in the official Master's reports to BP's head office in Sydney and the ensuing correspondence that followed confirms the internecine rivalry that existed between civilian, military and naval authorities and the strict censorship of fact that existed at the time.
I would like to state a little known fact that held the Japanese southward advance.The planned attack on the Australian mainland was fought on the Indian, Pacific and Timor oceans, the greatest and largest battle field of the war.
For every ship that was attacked by planes or submarines,there were a dozen that carried out their task of cargo delivery. Many allied flagged vessels spent years in the South Pacific ocean under charter to the Australian Shipping Control Board, sailing between Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, to Port Moresby, and Milne Bay,transporting iron ore, and coal interstate, keeping Australia's war effort functioning and in support of Australian troops in the "Battle Of The Beaches" and other supply bases in the South Pacific. They carried troops,tanks, bulldozers, gasolene, all the logistic equipment to wage war in the South Pacific, one such episode and demonstrating the emergency at the time, was the US Liberty ship Thoreau she received 1,500 Australian troops right off the troopship Queen Mary and transported them to New Guinea. Everyone of them a bloke from Tobruk, just back from 3 years service in North Africa, fighting Rommel's Panzer Divisions, they deserved a better fate than being crowded aboard a ten knot US Liberty ship for a slow trip to the steaming jungles of New Guinea and the Battle Of The Beaches.(Recollections Ron Wylie)
General Douglas MacArthur (Dougout Doug), paid this tribute to the Merchant Seamen of the Allied Nations in the Pacific War.
"They have brought us our lifeblood and they have paid for it with some of their own. I saw them bombed in New Guinea and the Phillipines ports, when it was humanly possible, when their ships were not blown out from under them by bombs or torpedoes, they delivered their cargoes to us who needed them so badly. In war it is performance that counts."
Survivors of the 39th Battalion struggled back to Port Moresby. They felt they deserved some praise and recognition for their actions and sacrifices of their wounded and the mates they left behind.The High Command and Politicians were out of touch with the realities of the Front Line. General Blamey then added insult to his ignorance."He told the men that they had been defeated, that he had been defeated , and that Australia had been defeated . "Remember" Blamey said "It's not the man with the gun that gets shot; it's the rabbit running away".
A comparison of casualty lists at Guadalcanal and Kokoda reveals that the Americans launched 60,000 troops against the Japanese in the Solomons and lost 1,600 killed 4,200 wounded. The Australians lost over 3,000 with another 5,500 wounded in the entire Kokoda Campaign. A further three times this number sucummed to disease in the steaming jungle of the Owen Stanley Ranges.
The egotistical megolamania of General Douglas MacArthur is best born out by his press release claiming the American forces had single handedly taken Buna and won the campaign. MacArthur ignored the Australians and his own Commander General Bob Eichelberger. The bloody beachhead battles, the same troops criticised by Blamey at Koitaki compared with the disappointing American performance at Buna under Gen. Eichelberger.
By January 1944 the US and British submarines were sending enemy merchantmen to the bottom at the rate of almost a third of a million tons a month. There was no way for the Japanese shipbuilding industry to keep pace. Over eight and a half milion tons of shipping had been sunk by 1945., a most significant contribution to winning the war in the Pacific.
March 1944 Gen MacArthur's staff arrive Pearl Harbor and present his planned 800mile coastline leapfrog hop to capture the strategic port of Hollandia, this is an accepted planned by passing of Japanese held positions from Madang, Wom, Aitape, Wewak, Alexishahen, Finchhafen, etc all to be cleaned out by Australian Forces supported by Allied shipping Dutch and Australian.
The destruction of the Japanese planes at Truk, the sinking of many oilers, sub tenders, supply ships. The destruction of the fleet supply train was as effective as the sinking of the capital ships. The evacuation of Truk by the Japanese and no ability to mount offensive operations was ended. The raid on Truk the Japanese Admirals maintained was the one that broke their back.
Without shipping, without supply no enemy force may operate as a threat, these two episodes were just as important in the decision of surrender by Japan as was the dropping of the Atom Bomb on their homeland
MacArthur was determined any road to Tokyo should pass through Manila. US Admiral Chester Nimitz knew that he could not make a large scale amphibious asault without the Pacific Fleet at his command. US Admiral King also disagreed with putting the naval forces under control of any General, particularly MacArthur.
Members of MacArthurs staff then planned the 800 mile leap frog to capture the strategic Japanese base at Hollandia Dutch New Guinea. Tension between the two staffs Naval and Military was running high at this point in time.
Extract from Rear Admiral Edwin T Layton U.S.N.(Ret.) Breaking The Secrets
Decrypt of the Japanese acceptance of surrender to US Admiral Nimitz I always wondered why Nimitz kept a picture of MacArthur displayed in his office unsigned. One day I asked? smiling, Adm. Nimitz replied
"Layton I'll tell you. It's to remind me not to be a horse's asshole."
The worst defeat 8 August 1942 Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa achieved total surprise when his force swept in and sank four Allied cruisers and a destroyer the Marine Transports were saved from complete destruction by the Japanese decision to withdraw, 16,000 Marines were left stranded on Tulagi and Guadalcanal.
Nimitz realised that confrontation had to be avoided at all cost. The naval set back of lost ships at Guardalcanal was partially offset when quote of Admiral Nimitz " MacArthur's tough Australian troops finally halted the stubborn Japanese assault on Port Moresby in the first week of September" unquote no American forces were involved at this stage in New Guinea.
Australian and New Zealand provided the Allies especially Britain with many needed supplies. New Zealand rationed its own food supply to increase the amount that could be sent to England.
In November 1942, when the allies were landing in North Africa, General Douglas MacArthur Supreme Commander SW. Pacific landed his green American troops on Buna beach in New Guinea, they were immediately met with heavy fire and discipline broke down, Macarthur's reaction was to declare an American victory, and send in his experienced Australian troops. They were successful, But taking Buna had left a bitter taste in the Australians mouth, MacArthur was abitter pill to swallow.
MacArthur recognized the importance of propaganda, and he often claimed American involvement in what should have been Australian laurels. Australians climbed across the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea, took Kokumbona, and were landing along the New Guinea backbone.
By 1944 the New guinea campaign was finally becoming an American Operation, 500,000 American Servicemen were in Australia, and both governments contemplated banning American-Australian marriages, Eventually 12,000 Australian women married Americans.
Australiia's Armed Forces tried to promote volunteerism. The Australian constitution, prohibited compulsory service overseas. By war's end, some 95% of her Army and 100% of her Navy and Merchant Navy were volunteers and could serve in New Guinea or Europe. Axis powers.
Vichy France finally agreed to the stationing of Japanese troops in French Indo-China.
The demand for bases was now conceded by Vichi France. Britain, Holland and the United States protested and froze all Japanese assets, but the troops went in. The Dutch East Indies cancelled all oil delivery arrangements and the Americans shortly imposed their own oil embargo. Japan had now lost most of its sources of oil.
November 1941 The recently completed fleet carrier "Indomitable" ran aground and was damaged off Kingston Jamaica. She was due to accompany the capital ships "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" to the far east as a deterrent to Japanese aggression , Her absence in December may have proved fatal to the two big ships.
Final steps to war with Japan - As talks dragged on and the United States demanded the departure of Japan from China as well as French Indo-China, the Japanese Pearl Harbor Strike Force sailed into the North Pacific. Vice Adm. Nagumo commanded the fleet carriers"Akagi", "Hiryu", "Shokako", and Zuikaku", plus two battleships , cruisers, and destroyers, Britain's limited naval deterrent to Japanese expansion , the capital ships "Prince of Wales ' and "Repulse" met at Colombo Ceylon on the 28th, en-route to Singapore. Without the fleet carrier"Indomitable" they had no ship-borne aircraft support.
Japan, Already established in Korea, Manchuria, China,
Hainan, Formosa, and the Mariana, Caroline and the Marshall Island groups, Japan also now had the whole of French Indo-China.
Japans main aim was the oil rich Dutch East Indies {DEI) now being indispensible. Also important was the closing of the Burma Road over which Allied supplies continued to roll . Both moves meant war with Britain and the US, the vital Japanese strategy was the establishment of the huge defence perimeter, stretching from Burma right round to the Aleutian Islands of Alaska. Only in this way could it hope to hold off the United States once its manpower and industrial resources were mobilised .
Britain and the U.S believed that control of seaborne commerce was critical to domination in time of war. If one combatant could manage to deny the use of the sea to the other, the other's economy would inevidently collapse, leading to victory.
Ironically German and Japanese Surface Raiders on Merchant Shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans could not establish command of the seas sourrounding Australia.
This led to the strategy of a fleet in being, a naval force kept deliberately in port to threaten rather than act.
The objective was to build a fleet capable of destroying the enemy main force in a single decisive battle. After this victory was won, it would be easy to enforce a blockade against enemy merchants and hunt down their vessels, for the weaker combatant, the goal was to delay a climactic battle as long as possible. While the opposing fleets, the enemy could not risk splitting their forces to close off trade routes. The strategy being a naval force kept in readiness.
This being the Mahanian Theory a focus on sea power as a crucial factor behind the rise of Japan prior to Pearl Harbor, and Germany prior to September 3rd.
The capability of Britain and America capable to rebuild and the risk of splitting forces to close off trade routes and the sea-road supply.
Winston Churchill 1943 "Sea Transport is the stem from which victory blooms. Since without supplies no army is good for anything"
"Commanders engaged on both sides are ultimately dependent on sea transport for the troops, airmen, equipment, food, ammunition and fuel that they need to fight as such it is the Battle For Sea Control . Leadership has never placed sufficient emphasis upon Sea Power, it dominates strategy, political and military" Captain A T Mahan USN.
Another crucial difference between continental and mercantile maritime warfare, is that the maritime environment which has the the dominent naval power can isolate the theatre of war, to prevent the enemy re-inforcements as well as secure its home defence.
Maritime warfare can only be exploited by a preponderant naval power.
Japan now had In the West much of China was ocupied and the neutrality pact with Russia, coupled withthe German invasion meant Japan had little to fear for now,Hong Kong could be taken easily from adjacent occupied China.
To the East were the vast distances of the Pacific. By taking the US islands of Guam and Wake, and some of the British Gilbert Islands, the Japanese mandated islands (Marshalls, Caroline's Marianas) were further protected. America was also kept at bay.
In the South - lay the oilfields of the Dutch East Indies and the protection offered by the island chain of Sumatra, Java and Bali through to Timor.
Southeast - Landings in north New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomons would protect the Japanese Carolines.
From there, forces could strike Australia and its supply routes.
Only when Japan sought to extend the southeast and eastern perimeters - at Guadalcanaland Midway Island in mid-1942 did it suffer the first defeats. America's growing power
would then make Allied victory inevitable.
Only the US Pacific Fleet posed an immediate danger to Japanese plans. Hence the decision to attack it in Pearl Harbor, rather than wait to fight through the Phillippines





