The Australian victory in the first New Guinea Campaign 1942-43 stopped the Japanese from invading Australia.
SEA POWER IN THE INDIAN PACIFIC
Prior to the the Second World War there was widespread interest evoked by developements in 1921 relating to the political relationship between the United States and Japan, the naval resources of these two powers, and the strategical problems that could arise in the unhappy event of an armed conflict for the mastery of the Pacific. Preface Sea-Power in the Pacific 1921 Hector. C. Bywater.
Both in Japan and the United States their exists those who believe that war is the only solvent of the differences grown up between the two nations since 1900.
General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Australia from the Phillippines on the 17th March 1941, (Lieut. General Wainwright remaining behind to command US Phillipine Forces and capture)
MacArhur was appointed Supreme Commander of the South West Pacific Area. He was received by Prime Minister Curtin as a conquering hero not as a defeated General from the Phillippines abandoning the US Forces. MacArthur was described as a paranoid egotist, his famous words “There can be no compromise. We shall win, or we shall die, and to this I pledge you the full resources of all the mighty power of my country and the blood of my countrymen“.
Extract “Hyper War: US Army in WW11: Victory in Papua ”
General Headquarters Southwest Pacific.
By agreement among the Governments of Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States there has been constituted, effective 1400 GMT, 18 April 1942, the Southwest Pacific area, with boundaries as defined in annex 1.
On 18 April, a month after his arrival in Australia, General Douglas MacArthur assumed command of the Southwest Pacific Area and chose to designate himself as Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area. All combat echelons of the Australian forces, naval, ground, and air were assigned to his command as of that date, and the Australian Commanders concerned were notified that orders issued by him as Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area were to be considered ”as emanating from the Australian Commonwealth Government”
The MacArthur’s blood being, US Army 1 Battalion Field Artillery Regiment (560 All ranks).diverted to New Caledonia when enroute to Manila, and transported from Darwin aboard the Burns Philp ship MV Tulagi en route to Dutch Timor, in support of the Australian Army “Sparrow Force” to repel the Japanese southern invasion to Australia. This convoy was attacked by Japanese aircraft and returned to Darwin to be involved in the heavy Japanese air raid on 19th February 1942,
MacArthur Supreme Commander South West Pacific Area, had only two divisions of raw poorly trained National Guard.
JAPANESE CONQUESTS 1939-1942
Axis Powers - Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in Berlin on the 27th September 1940. They jointly agreed to oppose any country joining the Allies at war - by which they meant the United States of America.
Vichy France finally agreed to the stationing of Japanese troops in French Indo-China.
The demand for bases was now conceded by Vichi France. Britain, Holland and the United States protested and froze all Japanese assets, but the troops went in. The Dutch East Indies cancelled all oil delivery arrangements and the Americans shortly imposed their own oil embargo. Japan had now lost most of its sources of oil.
November 1941 The recently completed fleet carrier “Indomitable” ran aground and was damaged off Kingston Jamaica. She was due to accompany the capital ships “Prince of Wales” and “Repulse” to the far east as a deterrent to Japanese aggression , Her absence in December may have proved fatal to the two big ships.
Final steps to war with Japan - As talks dragged on and the United States demanded the departure of Japan from China as well as French Indo-China, the Japanese Pearl Harbor Strike Force sailed into the North Pacific. Vice Adm. Nagumo commanded the fleet carriers”Akagi”, “Hiryu”, “Shokako”, and Zuikaku”, plus two battleships , cruisers, and destroyers, Britain’s limited naval deterrent to Japanese expansion , the capital ships “Prince of Wales ‘ and “Repulse” met at Colombo Ceylon on the 28th, en-route to Singapore. Without the fleet carrier”Indomitable” they had no ship-borne aircraft support.
Japan, Already established in Korea, Manchuria, China,
Hainan, Formosa, and the Mariana, Caroline and the Marshall Island groups, Japan also now had the whole of French Indo-China.
Japans main aim was the oil rich Dutch East Indies {DEI) now being indispensible. Also important was the closing of the Burma Road over which Allied supplies continued to roll . Both moves meant war with Britain and the US, the vital Japanese strategy was the establishment of the huge defence perimeter, stretching from Burma right round to the Aleutian Islands of Alaska. Only in this way could it hope to hold off the United States once its manpower and industrial resources were mobilised .
Britain and the U.S believed that control of seaborne commerce was critical to domination in time of war. If one combatant could manage to deny the use of the sea to the other, the other’s economy would inevidently collapse, leading to victory.
Ironically German and Japanese Surface Raiders on Merchant Shipping in the Indian and Pacific Oceans could not establish command of the seas sourrounding Australia.
This led to the strategy of a fleet in being, a naval force kept deliberately in port to threaten rather than act.
The objective was to build a fleet capable of destroying the enemy main force in a single decisive battle. After this victory was won, it would be easy to enforce a blockade against enemy merchants and hunt down their vessels, for the weaker combatant, the goal was to delay a climactic battle as long as possible. While the opposing fleets, the enemy could not risk splitting their forces to close off trade routes. The strategy being a naval force kept in readiness.
This being the Mahanian Theory a focus on sea power as a crucial factor behind the rise of Japan prior to Pearl Harbor, and Germany prior to September 3rd.
The capability of Britain and America capable to rebuild and the risk of splitting forces to close off trade routes and the sea-road supply.
Winston Churchill 1943 “Sea Transport is the stem from which victory blooms. Since without supplies no army is good for anything”
“Commanders engaged on both sides are ultimately dependent on sea transport for the troops, airmen, equipment, food, ammunition and fuel that they need to fight as such it is the Battle For Sea Control . Leadership has never placed sufficient emphasis upon Sea Power, it dominates strategy, political and military” Captain A T Mahan USN.
Another crucial difference between continental and mercantile maritime warfare, is that the maritime environment which has the the dominent naval power can isolate the theatre of war, to prevent the enemy re-inforcements as well as secure its home defence.
Maritime warfare can only be exploited by a preponderant naval power.
Japan now had In the West much of China was ocupied and the neutrality pact with Russia, coupled withthe German invasion meant Japan had little to fear for now,Hong Kong could be taken easily from adjacent occupied China.
To the East were the vast distances of the Pacific. By taking the US islands of Guam and Wake, and some of the British Gilbert Islands, the Japanese mandated islands (Marshalls, Caroline’s Marianas) were further protected. America was also kept at bay.
In the South - lay the oilfields of the Dutch East Indies and the protection offered by the island chain of Sumatra, Java and Bali through to Timor.
Southeast - Landings in north New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomons would protect the Japanese Carolines.
From there, forces could strike Australia and its supply routes.
Only when Japan sought to extend the southeast and eastern perimeters - at Guadalcanaland Midway Island in mid-1942 did it suffer the first defeats. America’s growing power would then make Allied victory inevitable.
Only the US Pacific Fleet posed an immediate danger to Japanese plans. Hence the decision to attack it in Pearl Harbor, rather than wait to fight through the Phillippines